[NBLUG/talk] Duplicating a server
Chris Palmer
chris at eff.org
Mon Nov 21 11:46:26 PST 2005
Lincoln Peters writes:
> And, yes, the --password-file argument has the same problem of storing
> the password in clear text.
As does SSH key authentication, if you don't protect the private key
file with a password (and, really, even if you do).
If you want automation, there has to be a cleartext secret somewhere, in
some form.
This situation:
$ umask 077
$ cd
$ mkdir secrets
$ vi secrets/rsync-passwd
$ ls -al secrets
total 8
drwx------ 3 chris chris 102 Nov 21 11:37 .
drwxr-xr-x 70 chris chris 2380 Nov 21 11:37 ..
-rw------- 1 chris chris 16 Nov 21 11:37 rsync-passwd
is pretty good, as far as it goes. rsync-passwd is as well-protected as
your private SSH key.
(Note that setting umask first, and using an interactive editor instead
of echo, is important for security -- avoiding race conditions and
attackers looking at the process table.)
> The problem is that the security chain is only as strong as its
> weakest link. If you forget even one tiny little detail, it puts the
> entire system at risk. So you're probably better off using SSH key
> authentication, thus avoiding the issue of passwords altogether and
> thereby eliminating several links from the chain.
I really don't think using SSH keys is much different. There is still a
stored secret; it's just bigger than your average password. The only
real difference between a password file and a cleartext private key is
that you can limit what SSH will execute when using key authentication.
(That mechanism is not foolproof either; see also sudo hijinks.)
--
http://www.eff.org/about/staff/#chris_palmer
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